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CAN’T HANDLE THE TRUTH!”

With these words, Colonel Nathan R. Jessep, played by Jack Nicholson in the movie A Few Good Men, expressed his outrage at being
caught in a lie. The lie is not relevant to our purposes today. What is
relevant is the fact that the truth eventually became known.
As we look to secure water supplies for the future, it is essential
that decisions regarding the allocation and management of water resources be based as much as possible on truth, not on illusions created
and perpetrated in the name of political expediency. As Col. Jessep
could not stand being caught in a lie, future water allocation and management decisions will not stand if they are based on illusion.
This paper addresses three illusions. The following Section focuses
on the myth of stationarity. The second Section debunks the assumption that physically available water supplies are also legally available.
The third Section addresses the illusion of “state primacy” in the allocation and management of water resources. Conclusions are contained in the final Section, “The Fourth Dimension.”
II. ILLUSION: STATIONARITY
“Stationarity—the idea that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of variability—is a foundational concept that per† D.Sc., School of Engineering and Applied Science, The George Washington
University, Washington, DC; J.D., University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Denver, CO; M.A., B.A., Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO; Of Counsel, Sullivan & Worcester, Attorneys at Law, Washington, DC; Consultant, Petroleum
Technology Research Centre, Regina, SK; gsherk@sandw.com or
gwsherk@h2olaw.com.
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meates training and practice in water-resource engineering.”1 This
concept was illustrated by Sauchyn:2
FIGURE 1: HYPOTHETICALSTATIONARITY

Unfortunately, while stationarity may be a foundational concept, it
is an illusion. As Milly, et al., have noted, “stationarity is dead and
should no longer serve as a central, default assumption in water-resource risk assessment and planning.”3
1. P.C.D. Milly, et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319
SCIENCE 573 (2008).
2. Dave Sauchyn, PowerPoint Presentation, Historic Water and Climate Fluctuations: The Effects of Climate on Water in the Canadian West Over the Last 1,000 years,
WATER, ENERGY AND CLIMATE SEC. IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFERENCE (Oct.
15–19, 2012) (on file with Author).
3. See P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?,
supra note 1, at 573. A closely related issue, unfortunately beyond the scope of this
brief overview, is the death of policy stationarity. As Wiltshire has noted, “[p]olicy
stationarity—the blind adherence to old courses of action—will no longer work in the
era of climate change.” Kimery Wiltshire, Beyond Stationarity: Building the Center
for Change, 8 SW. HYDROLOGY 28 (2009). See also, Robert W. Adler, Climate
Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 7 (2010)
(“There are serious limitations in the ability of the dominant existing systems of water
law to respond adequately to major changes in water supplies.”). Adler has also
noted that “[w]ithout substantial reforms, existing water institutions will have difficulty meeting existing demands on water resources, let alone the increased demands
brought about by climate change.” Robert W. Adler, Water Marketing as an Adaptive
Response to the Threat of Climate Change, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 729, 738 (2008) (emphasis in original). Accord, John N. Matthews et al., Converging Currents in ClimateRelevant Conversation: Water, Infrastructure, and Institutions, 9 PLOS BIOLOGY
E1001159 (2011); John N. Matthews and A. J. Wickel, Embracing Uncertainty in
Freshwater Climate Adaptation: A Natural History Approach, 3 CLIMATE & DEV. 269
(2009).
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The cause of death? “[S]ubstantial anthropogenic change of
Earth’s climate is altering the means and extremes of precipitation,
evapotranspiration and rates of discharge of rivers.”4 In essence, the
effects of climate change have rendered the concept of stationarity
illusory.5
In Figure 1, while the streamflow varies dramatically, the annual
average flows do not vary at all. This was a teddy bear belief, comforting but not real. Recent research by Sauchyn6 (and others) has
shown that average annual flows are decreasing throughout western
North America:
FIGURE 2: AVERAGE ANNUAL FLOW (M3/SEC), BOW RIVER
BANFF, ALBERTA, 1911-2010

AT

4. See Milly et al., supra note 1, at 573.
5. An excellent summary was provided by Abrams and Hall:
Anthropogenic climate change (climate change caused by human activities
such as pollution) has undercut the reliability of the stationarity assumption.
That is the conclusion of leading scientists, and is already evidenced by observed changes in means and extremes of precipitation, evaporation, and
rates of discharge of rivers. The changes being observed in recent years are
beyond what can be explained using the stationarity hypothesis, but are consistent with the observed results and updated predictions of improved climate change models. In layman’s terms, what stationarity-based models
cannot explain, climate change models do explain. Moreover, the changes
that those improved climate models predict for water availability in the
United States are momentous because the impacts exacerbate, rather than
relieve, existing regional shortages and flooding events.
Abrams and Hall, Framing Water Policy in a Carbon Affected and Carbon Constrained Environment, 50 NAT. RES. J. 3, 11–12 (2010) (citations omitted).
6. See Sauchyn, supra note 3. The Bow River in Alberta is not unlike any number of rivers in North America that have their headwaters in mountainous regions and
then flow through populated areas.
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The myth of stationarity had the effect of concealing natural variability. Such variability must be considered with regard to the physical
availability of water to meet both present and future water supply
needs. Not to consider such variability is to build a house (or a water
supply system) on sand.
This is illustrated in Figure 3, a depiction of long-term rainfall variability in New Mexico:
FIGURE 3: NEW MEXICO RAINFALL7

Two aspects of Figure 3 are of note: The average rainfall over the
period of record (14.5”) and the 1950’s drought of record. Note the
similarity. In essence, what had been perceived as the “drought of
record” was not an anomalous event; it was the long-term average.
The illusion that it had been the “drought of record” was based on
rainfall occurring only at the end of the Spanish Settlement period and
the beginning of the Statehood period. Given the reconstruction of
the historic record illustrated above, fundamental assumptions regarding the physical availability of water were incorrect.8 As noted above,
water allocation and management decisions will not stand if based on
such illusions.

7. Henri D. Grissino-Mayer, A 2129-Year Reconstruction of Precipitation for
Northwestern New Mexico, USA, TREE RINGS, ENV’T. & HUMANITY 191, 198 (J.S.
Dean & T.W. Swetnam eds., Radiocarbon 1996).
8. J. L. Banner, et al., Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water: A White Paper
Assessment of the Past, Present and Future and Recommendations for Action, 1 TEX.
WATER J. 1, 4, 6 (2010) (it should be noted that in Texas “[t]he 1950s drought is
commonly used as the worst-case-scenario for drought planning.”).
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The mere fact that water is flowing in a stream or is impounded in a
reservoir does not mean that the water is legally available for use or
appropriation. There are multiple constraints on the legal availability
of water. Some of these constraints are obvious while others are more
subtle.
Perhaps the most obvious constraint is the need to protect existing
water rights or permits from adverse impacts associated with new
uses. While there are multiple, state-specific exceptions, state water
rights or permit systems almost always protect existing uses. In the
prior appropriation doctrine states, this would amount to protecting
senior appropriators from the effects of more junior water uses. In
permit riparian states, one of the factors almost always included in the
list of factors to be considered when a new use is proposed is whether
that use will adversely impact existing uses.10
Any number of federal and state statutes may also restrict the legal
availability of water. For example:
A. Hydropower
In 1920, Congress enacted the Federal Water Power Act11 which
gave the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”)12 virtually exclusive authority over the licensure of hydroelectric projects.13 The provisions
of the 1920 Act were incorporated into the Federal Power Act of 1935
(the “FPA”).14
With regard to the legal availability of water, of particular relevance
is the language of 16 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2) which requires license applicants to present to the FPC “[s]atisfactory evidence [of compliance]
with the requirements of the laws of the State or States within which
the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed and banks
9. Portions of this section are adapted from George William Sherk, The
Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the Twenty-First Century: Is it Time to
Call Uncle? 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764 (2005).
10. See generally George William Sherk, East Meets West: The Tale of Two Water
Doctrines, 5 WATER RES. IMPACT 5 (2003); George William Sherk, Meetings of Waters: The Conceptual Confluence of Water Law in the Eastern and Western States, 5
NATURAL RES. & ENV’T 3 (1991); and George William Sherk, Eastern Water Law:
Trends in State Legislation, 9 VA. ENVTL L.J. 287 (1990).
11. Federal Water Power Act of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–828c (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
12. Pursuant to the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7385o (2000)), the FPC
was terminated, and its hydroelectric licensing power was transferred to the newlycreated Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171(a),
7172(a)(1)(A) (2000).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 817 (2000).
14. Federal Power Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 791a–828c (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
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and to the appropriation, diversion and use of water for power purposes.” In terms of the “laws of the State or States,” Congress disclaimed any intent “to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of
the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or
any vested right acquired therein.”15
For twenty-five years following enactment of the Federal Water
Power Act, the FPC interpreted these provisions as requiring it to defer to state water laws.16 This changed in 1946 when the Supreme
Court addressed these provisions in a case involving licensure of a
project for which the license applicant had failed to obtain a state permit. In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, the Court concluded that “[t]he detailed provisions of the [Federal Power] Act
providing for the federal plan of regulation leave no room or need for
conflicting state controls.”17 The Court rejected Iowa’s contention
that 16 U.S.C. § 821 required a contrary result, concluding that this
provision preserved only “proprietary rights” or “rights of the same
nature as those relating to the use of water in irrigation or for municipal purposes.”18
In 1990, the First Iowa decision was reaffirmed in California v.
FERC (“Rock Creek”).19 In a case involving the establishment of
minimum stream flows, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice O’Connor, refused to overturn First Iowa, concluding:
As Congress directed in FPA § 10(a), FERC set the conditions of
the license, including the minimum stream flow, after considering
which requirements would best protect wildlife and ensure that the
project would be economically feasible, and thus further power development. . . . Allowing California to impose significantly higher
minimum stream flow requirements would disturb and conflict with
the balance embodied in that considered federal agency determination. FERC has indicated that the California requirements interfere
with its comprehensive planning authority, and we agree that allowing California to impose the challenged requirements would be
contrary to congressional intent regarding the Commission’s licens-

15. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (2006).
16. Roderick E. Walston, State Regulation of Federally Licensed Hydropower
Projects: The Conflict between California and First Iowa, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 87, 91
(1990) (The FPC refused “to issue licenses for hydropower projects if the applicants
failed to acquire water rights under state law.”), cited in George William Sherk, Approaching a Gordian Knot: The Ongoing State/Federal Conflict Over Hydropwer, 31
LAND & WATER L. REV. 349, 352 (1996).
17. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 181 (1946)
(footnote omitted).
18. Id. at 176.
19. California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (“Rock Creek”), 495 U.S. 490
(1990).
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ing authority and would “constitute a veto of the project that was
approved and licensed by FERC.”20

The Rock Creek decision made it clear that the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) under the FPA will
preempt conflicting state laws and regulations and could preclude the
issuance of water use permits under state law. In essence, water
needed for hydroelectric projects licensed by FERC may be legally
unavailable for other uses.21
B. Water Quality
With enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments in 1972 (now known as the Clean Water Act), Congress
intended to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the nation’s water resources.22 To achieve these objectives, the Clean Water Act imposes a number of requirements that
may have the effect of limiting the legal availability of water.
One of these requirements is the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit.23 These permits, the issuance
of which is a condition precedent to the discharge of pollutants, contain specific provisions relating to the type and concentration of
materials to be discharged. The provisions contained in the NPDES
permit are determined in part by the assimilative capacity of the watercourse into which the pollutants are to be discharged. If the assimilative capacity of the watercourse changes (as would occur through a
reduction in streamflows), then the provisions of specific NPDES permits may have to be changed in order to reduce the type or concentration of materials to be discharged.24 In essence, the streamflows
anticipated when NPDES permits were issued, specifically the assimilative capacity provided by a given streamflow, may have the effect of
limiting the availability of water for future uses that would reduce
these streamflows.
C. Species Protection
There are a number of federal and state species protection statutes.
Perhaps the best known is the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)
which essentially prohibits any federal agency from taking any action
(including destruction of critical habitat) that would jeopardize the
continued existence of a threatened or endangered plant or animal
20. Id. at 506–07 (citations omitted) (quoting California ex rel. State Water Res.
Control Bd. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 877 F.2d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 1989)).
21. The potential for conflict regarding such conflicting uses is addressed in
greater detail in Sherk, Approaching a Gordian Knot: The Ongoing State/Federal
Conflict Over Hydropwer, supra note 16.
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
23. 33 U.S.C. §1342 (2000).
24. Id.
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species.25 The ESA also prohibits all parties (both public and private)
from undertaking actions that would result in the “taking” of a
threatened or endangered species.26
In essence, the ESA was intended to protect threatened and endangered species virtually irrespective of the cost of the protection.27 Of
particular importance with regard to the legal availability of water, the
ESA may require restrictions on the use of water to protect a
threatened or endangered species.28
D. Resource Management
With the enactment of the Coastal Zone Management Act
(“CZMA”), Congress established a national goal “to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources
of the Nation’s coastal zone for this and succeeding generations.”29
One way to achieve this goal, Congress noted, was “to encourage the
states to exercise their full authority over the lands and waters in the
coastal zone by assisting the states, in cooperation with federal and
local governments and other vitally affected interests, in developing
land and water use programs for the coastal zone, including unified
policies, criteria, standards, methods, and processes for dealing with
land and water use decisions of more than local significance.”30
25. See generally Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006 & Supp.
V 2011).
26. Id. at § 1538(a)(1). “The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. §1532(19) (2000). “[E]ndangered species” are defined as “any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range
other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a
pest whose protection under the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man. 16 U.S.C. §1532(6) (2000). “[T]hreatened species” are defined as “any species which is likely to become an endangered species
within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 16
U.S.C. §1532(20) (2000).
27. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (protection of the endangered snail darter under the ESA could preclude completion of a water project).
28. One of the clearest examples of the relationship between the ESA and state
laws regarding the allocation of water is Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069,
1993 WL 151353, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1993), sub nom. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 995
F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1993). At issue in the case was the relationship between the pumping of ground water from the Edwards Aquifer (pursuant to Texas law) and the need
to provide flows from Comal and San Marcos Springs in order not to adversely affect
species protected by the ESA. The decision of the district court judge was succinct:
“Priority is to be given to species whose survival is in conflict with economic activities,
such as withdrawal of water from the Edwards.” Slip opinion at 32. See also Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Stipo, 658 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1981), sub nom. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. Colo. 1983), aff’d 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir.
1985) (exercise of water rights on the South Platte River in Colorado could be restricted in order to ensure supply of water for endangered species located in
Nebraska).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (2000).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (2000).
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As a mechanism to “encourage the states to exercise their full authority over the lands and waters in the coastal zone,” the CZMA
provided that “[a]ny Federal agency which shall undertake any development project in the coastal zone of a state shall insure that the project is, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with the
enforceable policies of approved state management programs.”31
Coastal states are authorized to prepare such coastal zone management programs which are then submitted to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce, for
approval.
Once the state coastal zone management program has been approved, activities of federal agencies (including activities undertaken
by federal agencies, activities requiring federal permits, and activities
receiving federal funding) must be consistent with the approved program to the maximum extent practicable.32 These federal activities
need not occur in the coastal zone. Only the effects of the activities
need be felt there.33
As a result, water that is physically available in an upstream state
may not be legally available if (a) development of the water resource
would involve any federal agency34 and (b) the impacts of the proposed development would be inconsistent with a lower basin state’s
approved coastal zone management plan.
E. Allocation Mechanisms
Among the more subtle restrictions on the legal availability of
water are the different mechanisms by which interstate water conflicts
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(2) (2000).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1455 (2000).
33. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A) (“Each Federal agency activity within or outside
the coastal zone that affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal
zone shall be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent
practicable with the enforceable policies of approved State management programs.”)
(emphasis added).
34. For example, it would be virtually impossible to develop a water project without discharging dredge or fill materials into watercourses and wetlands. Such discharges are prohibited absent the issuance of a permit by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. 33 U.S.C. §1344. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 123 (1985) (“Under §§ 301 and 502 of the [Clean Water] Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311 and 1362, any discharge of dredged or fill materials into ‘navigable waters’—
defined as the ‘waters of the United States’—is forbidden unless authorized by a permit issued by the Corps of Engineers pursuant to § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344). Applications for “§404 permits” are subject to Environmental Protection Agency review and
may also be reviewed by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service. Factors to be considered when permit applications are reviewed include
the anticipated impacts on water quality, fish, wildlife, recreation, land use, and aesthetics. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c). The need to protect from flood damage that could
result from the dredge or fill activity must also be considered. 40 C.F.R. § 230.41.
Permit applications are to be denied “if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge that would have less impact on the aquatic ecosystem.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 230.10(a).
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are managed in the United States. In general, there are three alternative (but not mutually exclusive) conflict management mechanisms:
Interstate water compacts (e.g., the Colorado River Compact35), federal legislation (e.g., the Boulder Canyon Project Act36), and Supreme
Court equitable apportionment decisions (e.g., Kansas v. Colorado37).
Compliance with the provisions of any of these conflict management
mechanisms may preclude an upstream state from using water to
which a lower basin state has an entitlement.
IV. ILLUSION: STATE PRIMACY
In 1978, the Supreme Court in California v. United States addressed
the relationship between the federal government and the states regarding the allocation and management of water: “The history of the
relationship between the Federal Government and the States in the
reclamation of the arid lands of the Western States is both long and
involved, but through it runs the consistent thread of purposeful and
continued deference to state water law by Congress.”38 Three years
later, former Solicitor of the Interior William Coldiron noted that the
federal government had deferred to state water in thirty-seven separate statutes39 beginning with the Mining Law of 186640 and the Desert Land Act of 1877.41
Such comments would appear to suggest that state primacy in the
allocation and management of water is not an illusion. While state
primacy may have been less of an illusion in an era of abundant water
supplies, when conflicts over the use of water had yet to become the
norm, the actual relationship between the federal and state governments was described by Justice Douglas in Oklahoma ex rel Phillips v.
Guy F. Atkinson Co.:42
“Whenever the constitutional powers of the federal government and
those of the state come into conflict, the latter must yield.” Florida
v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 . . . . [T]he suggestion that this project
35. THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928), is discussed at
GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE RESOLUTION OF INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES at 25–26 (2000).
36. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617–617(v) (2000); see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
564–65 (1963) (concluding that Congress, when it enacted the BCPA in 1928, “intended to and did create its own comprehensive scheme for the apportionment among
California, Arizona, and Nevada of the Lower Basin’s share of the mainstream waters
of the Colorado River, leaving each State its tributaries.”).
37. See generally GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE RESOLUTION OF INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).
38. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978).
39. W. Coldiron, Nonreserved Water Rights—United States Compliance with
State Law, 88 Interior Dec. 1055, 1060 (11 Sept. 1981), http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/de
cisions/doi_decisions_088.pdf.
40. Submerged Lands, ch. 29, 14 Stat. 251 (1866).
41. Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877).
42. 313 U.S. 508, 534–535 (1941).
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interferes with the state’s own program for water development and
conservation is likewise of no avail. That program must bow before
the “superior power” of Congress.

The “superior power” of Congress is based on several Constitutional provisions, including the Property Clause,43 the Commerce
Clause,44 and the Treaty Clause.45 To the extent that the allocation or
management of water resources is affected by federal laws or regulations based on any of these Constitutional provisions, conflicting state
laws may be preempted. The language of the Supremacy Clause46 is
clear:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

In essence, a different rule has emerged to replace the illusion of
state primacy: States have primacy over that quantity of water that is
not required for federal purposes.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FOURTH DIMENSION
In The Tempest, Shakespeare noted that what is past is prologue.
With regard to the allocation and management of water resources,
precisely the opposite is likely to become the rule. As Barnett, et al.,
have noted, “the greatest risk about the future of climate-sensitive systems is to assume that the climate of the last century will be the climate we will face in the next.”47

43. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”).
44. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes”).
45. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; (“The President . . . shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur”).
46. U.S. Const. art. VI, ¶ 2.
47. Tim Barnett, et al., The Effects of Climate Change on Water Resources in the
West: Introduction and Overview, 62 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 8 (2004), cited in Robert
W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 9 (2010). Accord, Roger Piekle, Collateral Damage from the Death of Stationarity, GEWEX WCRP 5 (May 2009) (“. . . we have to improve our ability to anticipate the future, because relying on the statistics of the past will no longer be a useful
guide to what is to come”).
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Particularly in Texas, the physical availability of water is going to
decrease.48 As depicted in Figure 4, the only real question is how
much?
FIGURE 4: TREE RING AND CLIMATE MODEL49 PROJECTED PALMER
DROUGHT SEVERITY INDEX50
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As the amount of water that is physically available decreases, the
amount that is legally available will also decrease, perhaps at a greater
rate. As physically available supplies decline, the percentage of remaining supplies that is already committed to existing uses and statutory or regulatory requirements may very well increase at a
disproportionate rate.
A reduction in both the physical and legal availability of water is
going to increase dramatically the risk associated with the development of new water supplies. For example, repayment of revenue
bonds issued for the construction of water supply systems, and guaranteed through the delivery of water to municipal and industrial customers, could end up facing default if the water to be delivered is neither
physically nor legally available. Similar limitations could face waterdependent industries that plan to develop their own water supplies.

48. “The Southwest appears to be entering a new drought era . . . [A] near perpetual state of drought will materialize in the coming decades as a consequence of increasing temperature.” Martin Hoerling & John Eischeid, Past Peak Water in the
Southwest, 6 SW. HYDROLOGY 18 (2007), cited in Adler, supra note 3, at 14, available
at http://www.swhydro.arizona.edu/archive/V6_N1/feature2.pdf.
49. Jay L. Banner, et al., Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water: A White Paper
Assessment of the Past, Present and Future and Recommendations for Action, 1 TEX.
WATER J. 1, 6 (2010), available at http://journals.tdl.org/twj/index.php/twj/issue/view/
121. The historic record is based on tree ring studies. The future projections are
based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emission scenario A2
using the Canadian Global Climate Model. This model assumes high population
growth and slow technological change. It is, in essence, the “business as usual”
model.
50. Id. The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) considers both precipitation
and temperature.
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FIGURE 5: OBSERVED AND MODELED SURFACE TEMPERATURE
ANOMALIES FOR TEXAS51
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With regard to the risks associated with the development of new
water supply systems in Texas, the modeled surface temperature
anomalies illustrated in Figure 5 provide a disturbing analogy. Each
of the emission scenarios (models A2, A1B and B1) show an increase
in surface temperature anomalies.52 It is not a question of whether
surface temperature anomalies will increase. The only relevant questions are now how soon and how much?
This is precisely what can be said of the risk associated with the
development of new water supply systems. How much is the risk going to increase? How soon? Until such questions have been answered, the success of any attempt to secure water supplies for the
future may also be illusory.
51. Id. at 9.
52. See Banner, et al., Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water: A White Paper
Assessment of the Past, Present and Future and Recommendations for Action, supra
note 49, at 9. Model A2 is the “business as usual” scenario. Model A1B assumed
more balanced energy uses. Model B1 assumes a rapid change to clean, efficient energy technologies.
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